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The dramatic increase in securitisation activity has modified the functioning of credit 
markets by reducing the fundamental role of liquidity transformation performed by financial 
intermediaries. We claim that the changing role of banks from “originate and hold” to 
“originate, repackage and sell” has also modified banks’ abilities to grant credit and the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary policy. Using a large sample of 
European banks, we find that the use of securitisation appears to shelter banks’ loan supply 
from the effects of monetary policy. Securitisation activity has also strengthened the 
capacity of banks to supply new loans but this capacity depends upon business cycle 
conditions and, notably, upon banks’ risk positions. In this respect, the recent experience of 
the sub-prime mortgage loans crisis is very instructive. 
 
JEL classification: E44, E55. 









The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether securitization activity affects the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy via the bank lending channel. In recent years, 
securitization activity has expanded in the euro area changing the monitoring role of banks, 
and reducing their fundamental role of liquidity transformation. In other words, even if a 
project is illiquid, the underlying loan may be sold on to the markets providing banks with 
additional sources of financing and the possibility to transfer the underlying credit risk. As a 
result, banks maintain a major role as originators of credit while progressively losing 
importance in their function as primary holders of illiquid assets. All these developments are 
likely to have contributed to a change in the way banks grant credit to borrowers and react to 
monetary policy shocks. 
We argue that the development of securitisation has changed the bank lending channel 
transmission mechanism as well as the relevance of the standard liquidity-to-total asset ratio, 
used by the literature to identify a bank’s ability to insulate its loan portfolio from monetary 
policy shocks. The effects of securitization on loan supply are analysed by means of an 
extensive database of asset-backed securities issued since 1999, matching them with 
individual bank balance-sheet information.  
We find that asset securitization significantly reduces the relevance of the bank 
lending channel of monetary policy transmission. This effect seems to depend upon two 
main mechanisms. First, asset securitization increases banks’ liquidity while reducing banks’ 
funding needs in the event of monetary tightening. Second, securitization allows banks to 
swiftly transfer part of their credit risk to the markets (including institutional investors such 
as hedge funds, insurance companies and pension funds) thereby reducing their regulatory 
requirements on capital. Our results point out that the effectiveness of the bank lending 
channel strongly depends on banks’ capacity to “originate, repackage and sell” their loans. 
Securitisation activity strengthens the capacity of banks to supply new loans to households 
and firms for a given amount of funding. However, we show that this capacity changes over 
time and is dependent on business cycle conditions as well as on banks’ risk situation.  
Overall, these results emphasise the importance of analysing developments in banks’ 
situation and securitisation activity from a monetary policy perspective. In this light, the 6
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recent tensions in credit risk markets, starting late in the summer of 2007, brought to the fore 
the role of financial innovation in connection to bank risk-taking.
1 While this is obviously a 
dynamic process, the recent crisis also vouches for the importance of considering 
developments in the banking sector when assessing the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. 
 
                                                           
1 A possible consequence of the recent crisis could be that investors analyse more carefully certain forms of 
asset-backed securities that have had spectacular growth rates in recent years. 7
ECB





European banks rarely used securitisation techniques before the introduction of the euro. In 
the last decade, however, there has been a spectacular increase in securitisation activity in 
the euro area. This is partly a global trend but the escalation in securitisation activity is also 
linked to other factors such as the closer integration in European financial markets as well as 
a move towards a more market-based financial system. This development has probably 
changed the monitoring function performed by banks (Diamond, 1984; Holmström and 
Tirole, 1997). Securitisation has also reduced the fundamental role traditionally performed 
by banks in liquidity transformation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In other words, nowadays 
even if a project is illiquid, the underlying loan may, in principle, be sold on to the market 
providing originating banks with additional sources of financing. In this way, while the 
origination of bank loans remains to a large extent local, securitisation can make previously 
illiquid loans tradable and available to global investors. As a result, banks maintain a central 
role as originators and evaluators of credit risk, while progressively losing importance as 
primary holders of illiquid assets. 
Loan securitization activity together with the emergence of credit derivative markets 
seems to have altered credit risk management by banks. Through these financial innovations, 
credit risk may be easily transferred away from banks’ balance sheets to other economic 
agents. Protection sellers, in turn, may further combine and diversify their asset portfolio, 
reaching parts of the credit spectrum that, until recently, were mostly illiquid. All these 
developments are likely to have contributed to a change in the way banks grant loans and 
react to monetary policy shocks. 
We add to the “bank lending channel” literature by considering the effects of 
securitisation on loan supply. To date, the “identification problem” of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy has been solved by claiming that only certain bank-specific 
characteristics (such as size, liquidity and capitalization) influence loan supply movements, 
while the demand for bank loans from borrowers is largely independent of them. After a 
tightening of monetary policy, the drop in the supply of bank loans is expected to be larger 
for: (1) small banks, which are financed almost exclusively from deposits and equity 8
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(Kashyap and Stein, 1995); (2) less liquid banks, which cannot protect their loan portfolio 
against monetary tightening simply by drawing down cash and securities (Stein, 1998; 
Kashyap and Stein, 2000) and (3) poorly capitalised banks, which might be below their 
target capital and have less access to markets for uninsured funding (Peek and Rosengren, 
1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 2002).
2 
This paper argues that the development of securitisation has changed the bank lending 
channel mechanism. Securitisation has also probably altered those bank characteristics 
usually emphasised in the literature to identify shifts in loan supply. The size indicator is less 
significant because securitisation activity can considerably reduce the amount of loans on 
banks’ balance sheets (DeYoung and Rice, 2004). Liquidity is also affected by securitisation 
because of the short-term inflows caused by the sale of asset-backed securities that modify 
the standard liquidity ratio. Securitization activity may also reduce the regulatory 
requirements for capital and make the standard capital-to-asset ratio a poor approximation of 
the relevant capital constraints faced by banks in this regard. More broadly, securitisation 
provides banks with additional flexibility to face changes in market conditions associated 
with monetary policy movements. 
An extensive database of asset-backed securities is used to analyse the impact of 
securitisation on loan supply, focusing not only on the securitisation of mortgage markets, 
but also on other forms of bank loans. We employ therefore a comprehensive dataset of 
asset-backed securities issued since 1999, when the market started in the euro area, matching 
them with individual bank’s balance-sheet information. The estimation is performed using 
an approach similar to that used within the Monetary Transmission Network, a joint project 
conducted by a group of economists affiliated with the ECB and the National Central Banks 
of the Eurosystem (Angeloni, Mojon and Kashyap, 2003). 
The main finding of the paper is that asset securitisation significantly reduces the 
importance of the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. This effect seems 
to depend upon two main mechanisms: first, asset securitisation increases banks’ liquidity 
                                                           
2 All these studies on cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of the “bank lending channel” refer to the 
US. The literature on European countries is far from conclusive (see, amongst others, Ehrmann et al., 2003 and 
Altunbas, De Bondt and Marqués, 2004). 
 9
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and reduces banks’ funding needs in the event of monetary tightening; second, it allows 
banks to transfer a part of their credit risk to the markets (including institutional investors 
such as hedge funds, insurance companies and pension funds) and thereby reduce their 
regulatory requirements on capital. This capital relief seems to cause, ceteris paribus, a 
further increase in supplied lending.  
Securitisation activity has also strengthened the capacity of banks to supply new loans 
to households and firms for a given amount of funding. However, we show that this capacity 
changes over time due to business cycle conditions: it is maximised during economic 
expansion when there is probably little uncertainty (in the terms of Frank Knight) among 
investors about the valuation of structured products. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines recent 
developments in securitisation activity in the euro area, compared with experiences in the 
United States. These institutional developments provide the basis for the subsequent 
econometric analysis in Section 3, which considers how securitisation activity may affect the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Section 4 describes the econometric model and the data, 
while Section 5 presents evidence on the response of bank lending to a monetary shock. 
Section 6 describes some robustness checks performed on the results. The final section 
summarises the main conclusions. 
2. Developments in securitisation in the euro area 
Securitisation can be defined, in a broad way, as the process whereby individual bank 
loans and other financial assets are bundled together into tradable securities that are sold to 
the secondary market. In the United States the market for asset-backed securities started to 
develop by means of government-sponsored agencies (such as the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation or Freddie Mac)
3 that enhanced mortgage loan liquidity by issuing and 
guaranteeing, but not originating, asset-backed securities. These agencies contributed to the 
progressive growth in the outstanding volume of US agency mortgage-backed securities to 
                                                           
3 Created in 1938 and 1968, respectively. 
 10
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USD 4 trillion at the end of 2006. Including both agency and non-agency issues, the US 
market for mortgage-related securities nowadays accounts for over USD 6.5 trillion, 
representing the largest segment of the fixed income market in the world (to give an idea of 
the magnitude, the US corporate bond market accounts for USD 5.4 trillion, while the 
Treasury segment accounts for USD 4.3 trillion). 
In contrast to the US experience, the development of the asset securitisation market in 
the euro area started much later - at the end of the 1990s - and was not triggered by the 
introduction of any specific government agencies.
4 As shown in Figure 1, the growth in 
euro-denominated securitisation started at the end of the 1990s and accelerated strongly from 
2004 onwards. The annual net flow of asset-backed securities issuance in 2006 was around 
one fifth of total bank loans granted to households and non-financial corporations in the euro 
area.  
The reasons for the spectacular growth in securitisation activity in the euro area since 
1999 are linked to three main factors: the increased demand from investors; technological 
and financial innovation; and the introduction of euro. First, the demand for asset-backed 
securities has grown rapidly from institutional investors, who are more willing and able to 
invest in credit risk. Asset-backed securities cater for the increasing number of sophisticated 
institutional investors seeking to buy assets that typically have a good rating and provide an 
extra yield over government bonds (Rajan, 2006). Moreover, these securities can be 
constructed to offer specific, sometimes even tailor-made, risk-return trade-offs that can be 
segmented by rating, asset class, sector and country of origination thereby tapping into a 
broader investor base. 
Second, technological advancements have been instrumental in the development of 
securitisation via dramatic improvements in the storage, processing and pricing of financial 
data. Technological progress has therefore changed the cost structure of issuing asset-backed 
securities and increased the spectrum of financial products.  
                                                           
4 Unlike in the United States and United Kingdom, where a common law system is in place, most continental 
European countries possess a continental law framework under which a specific regulation is required to issue 
asset-backed securities. In this respect, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain had to 
enact specific laws to remove obstacles to the development of securitisation. 11
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Third, in addition to these global trends, the introduction of the euro has given a strong 
impulse to the corporate bond and securitisation markets (ECB, 2007). The disappearance of  
exchange rate risk among euro-area countries, the increase in financial integration (Baele et 
al., 2004) and a more market-based financial system have all contributed to enhancing the 
liquidity and size of the securitisation market. As a result, institutional investors increased 
their cross-country exposure while issuers gained access to a broader pool of potential 
investors. At the same time, increased bank competition also helped by lowering 
underwriters’ and managers’ fees.  
The increase in the use of securitisation techniques in the euro area has been 
widespread but remains heterogeneous across countries (see Figure 2). In relative terms, 
asset securitisation has been strongest in countries which have undergone significant 
increases in real estate prices since the introduction of the euro such as Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and the Netherlands (Figure 3). In this respect, it is worth noting that residential as well as 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (RMBS and CMBS) accounted for 68% of all euro-
denominated securities issued (Figure 4). This is mainly because of the strong degree of 
commoditisation of this type of loan, as well as the high standardisation of credit assessment 
techniques that makes the pooling and selling of a large number of mortgages easier to 
originate for borrowers and easier to assess for investors. Balance sheet cash-flow 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) accounted for around 18% while consumer and 
corporate asset-backed securities (ABS) represented around 14% of total issuance. In terms 
of originators, the securitisation market is overwhelmingly dominated by commercial banks, 
while the share of securitisation products issued directly by non-financial corporations 
remains relatively very small (ECB, 2007). 
The location of the credit investors may be very far away from the residence of the 
household or the corporate borrower. In this respect, based on a survey conducted by the 
Bond Market Association, for the period 2005-2006, less than 50% of the risk connected to 
European ABS structured products was bought by euro-area investors (see Figure 5). More 
than one third was bought by UK investors, while the remainder was disseminated 
elsewhere, including Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Similar results are obtained when 
examining the investor location of CDOs. Given this increase in the distance between 
borrowers and credit investors, the role of the market in pricing such assets, together with 12
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that of rating agencies, becomes pivotal as a signal of credit risk and as a disciplining 
mechanism. 
In this paper, we focus on the traditional concept of securitisation which involves both 
full funding via the true sale of bank loans as well as credit risk transfer (these instruments 
account for 84% of total securitisation activity in Europe). Special care is taken to account 
for individual banks’ characteristics, including market-derived measures of banks’ risk.
5 The 
latter control is very important also in light of the more recent tensions in credit risk markets 
that started in the summer of 2007. The turmoil underlined the role of financial innovation in 
connection with bank risk-taking and the necessity of a more careful analysis from investors 
of certain forms of asset-backed securities. 
3.  How does securitisation affect the monetary transmission mechanism? 
The changing role of banks from “originate and hold” to “originate, repackage and 
sell” is likely to have influenced the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary 
policy. We claim that the standard set up of the bank lending channel to capture the effect of 
banks’ conditions on loan supply changes if banks can grant mortgages and other loans, and 
are able to pass them on to markets. 
In their seminal work, Bernanke and Blinder (1988) show that if some borrowers have 
limited access to the capital market and depend mostly on bank loans for external funding, 
bonds and loans are imperfect substitutes and changes in the composition of bank assets also 
influence investment financing. In response to monetary tightening, the credit channel works 
if the reduction in supplied loans is not counterbalanced by greater access by firms to the 
capital markets. 
                                                           
5 By looking at the true sales of bank loans, we analyse the funding element of securitisation rather than its 
overall credit risk transfer effect, which could also be obtained through other instruments such as credit 
derivatives or the syndicated loan market. It is worth noting that we analyse the value of securitised assets that 
are removed from the bank’s balance sheet so that the performance of these securities no longer depends on the 
institution originating the loans but on the situation of the financial assets pooled. In other words, credit risk is 
“bankruptcy remote” from the originator. This contrasts with the case of corporate bonds where the bond is 
essentially backed by a promise to pay by the issuer. 13
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The literature on the bank lending channel claims that banks’ conditions also affect 
how banks’ supply of credit responds to monetary policy changes. After monetary 
tightening, the response of supplied lending will be less severe for big, liquid and well-
capitalised banks (Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995; Stein, 1998; Van den Heuvel, 2002; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). For 
example, big and well-capitalised banks have more access to markets for uninsured funding, 
while liquid banks may simply draw down cash and securities to attenuate for the effects of a 
drop in deposits. 
Securitisation provides an alternative way for banks to maintain the credit relationship 
with the client by simply bundling together some loans into tradable securities and selling 
them on to the secondary market. This has major consequences for the standard transmission 
mechanism. First, banks may obtain additional liquidity independently of their securities 
holdings and the standard liquidity indicator may be less informative than in the past. This 
mechanism reduces the effectiveness of the bank lending channel in a way similar to the 
critique advanced by Romer and Romer (1990). According to these authors, if banks had the 
possibility to raise, without limit, CDs or bonds, which are not subject to reserve 
requirements, the bank lending channel would be ineffective. In this respect, through 
securitisation, loans can be readily removed from banks’ balance sheets and changed in cash; 
findings for the US jumbo mortgages market suggest that securitisation could make the bank 
lending channel less effective (Loutskina and Strahan, 2006).
6 
Second, by removing loans from their balance-sheet, banks can obtain regulatory 
capital relief on account of the transfer of credit risk, which allows for a positive net effect 
on the loan supply. This mechanism is expected to continue with the implementation of the 
Basel II Accord - provided banks also remove the underlying risk from their balance sheet - 
                                                           
6 Existing evidence on the effects of securitisation on interest rates remains scarce and conclusions are mixed. 
Kolari, Fraser and Anari (1998) show that securitisation activity increases liquidity in the mortgage market and 
insulates mortgage interest rates from the effects produced by the monetary policy operations of the central 
bank. On the contrary, Estrella (2002) finds that the reaction of mortgage rates to changes in the federal funds 
rate is stronger with an increasing recourse to securitization. He concludes that the change in efficacy of 
monetary policy appears to derive from non-interest effects, such as the liquidity and credit volumes. In line 
with this finding, Fernald, Keane and Mosser (1994), examine the influence of securitisation on the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism using mortgage-backed securities as an example and conclude that the IT 
revolution is raising the effectiveness of interest rate channels. 14
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which has a stronger focus on credit risk management and economic capital.
7 At the same 
time, the final effect on credit risk is very difficult to predict because banks may be induced 
to shift to riskier assets (Donahoo and Shaffer, 1991; Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003).
8   
Details of the effects of securitisation on bank lending behaviour can also be found in 
the existing literature. Loan sales provide a lower cost method of financing for banks facing 
a competitive deposit market (Pennacchi, 1988). This effect has probably become stronger in 
recent years. James (1988) examines the incentives for banks to engage in “off-balance 
sheet” activities, such as commercial loan sales and points out that these can mitigate the 
“under-investment” problem for banks which previously issued risky debt. In other words, 
loan sales permit banks to invest in more projects with positive net present value than would 
have been the case in the past. 
More recently, some papers have focused on how securitisation activity evolves 
through the business cycle, although the evidence produced to date is far from conclusive. 
On the one hand, Stanton (1998) finds that securitisation increases in periods of cyclical 
downturns or individual firm weakness. On the other hand, Estrella (2002) points out that 
securitisation of multi-family home mortgages, as a proportion of outstanding mortgages, 
tends to decline during recessions. The link between securitization and the business cycle is 
also very important as regards the implications for monetary policy. Kuttner (2000) 
examines this issue by comparing the relative growth of ABS and bank loans over the 
business cycle. If banks use securitisation to shield their supply of loans from the effects of 
monetary policy, the volume of ABS should move in opposite direction in response to 
monetary policy. 
Overall, the increasing importance of loan securitisation together with the emergence 
of the credit derivative market, have improved credit risk management by banks. Through 
these innovations, credit risk can be commoditised and transferred away from banks’ balance 
sheets to other economic agents who might, in turn, acquire credit risk to diversify their 
                                                           
7 While asset-backed securities are expected to remain the dominant instrument being securitised, higher 
growth is expected on less granular securities such as small and medium enterprise CDOs and other corporate-
backed deals owing to the greater scope for capital release (Hancock et al., 2005 and J. P. Morgan, 2006). 
8 For an analysis of the interactions between capital reserve requirements and securitisation see, among others, 
Nwogugu (2007). 15
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overall risk position or to generate revenues. This probably also has some consequences for 
the bank lending channel. 
In recent years, better credit risk management by banks may have partly contributed to 
the observed gradual easing of credit standards applied to loans and credit lines observed, as 
reported in the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (Figure 6). This diminishing pressure on banks’ 
balance sheets is also reflected in the increase in the distance to default of banks in recent 
years (Figure 7). All these developments may have contributed, other things being equal, to 
a relaxation of constraints on banks’ loan supply. This issue will be addressed in the 
econometric part of the paper by explicitly taking into account the link between banks’ risk 
and lending supply.
9 
4. The econometric model and the data 
The empirical specification, based on Kashyap and Stein (1995), Ehrmann et al. (2003) 
and Ashcraft (2006), is designed to test whether banks that securitise loans react differently 
to monetary policy shocks. This approach is in line with the research conducted within the 
Monetary Transmission Network (Angeloni, Mojon and Kashyap, 2003).  
The model is given in the following equation:
10 
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9 A complete analysis of the impact of the use of credit derivatives on loan supply goes beyond the scope of 
this study. In general, new risk management techniques in the presence of friction should, ceteris paribus, 
increase the supply of bank credit. Existing empirical studies and practitioners assessments drawn from fact-
finding exercises support this idea (ECB, 2007). In this respect, Hirtle (2007), using data on individual loans 
made by a sample of banks between 1997 and 2005, finds evidence suggesting that greater use of credit 
derivatives is associated with the greater supply of bank credit for large loans (i.e. to large corporate 
borrowers), although not for (previously negotiated) commitment lending. On-balance-sheet amounts of 
commercial and industrial loans also appear to increase as the protection afforded by credit derivatives rises. 
Goderis et al. (2006) find that banks adopting advanced credit risk management techniques experience a 
permanent increase in their target loan levels of around 50%. 
10 The model in levels implicitly allows for fixed effects and these are discarded in the first difference 
representation given in equation (1). 
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with i=1,…, N , k= 1, …,12 and  t=1, …, T where N is the number of banks, k is the country 
and T is the final year. 
In equation (1) the growth rate in bank lending to residents (excluding interbank 
positions), Δln(Loans), is regressed on nominal GDP growth rates, Δln(GDPN), to control 
for country-specific loan demand shifts. The introduction of this variable captures cyclical 
macroeconomic movements and serves to isolate the monetary policy component of interest 
rate changes (ΔiM). The econometric specification also includes four interactions between 
changes in the interest rate controlled by the monetary policy authority and bank-specific 
characteristics: SEC, the securitisation activity indicator, SIZE, the log of total assets, LIQ, 
securities and other liquid assets over total assets, CAP, the capital-to-asset ratio. Bank-
specific characteristics refer to t-1 in order to avoid an endogeneity bias.  










SEC , where SL 
stands for the flow of securitised lending in year t and TAt-1 represents total assets at the end 
of the previous year. Following Ehrmann et al. (2003), all bank-specific characteristics have 
been normalised with respect to their average across all banks in the respective sample, in 
order to get indicators that amount to zero over all observations. This means that for model 
(1) the average of the interaction terms are also zero, and the parameters  j β  may be broadly 
interpreted as the average monetary policy effect on lending for a theoretical average bank. 
The sample used relates to the period from 1999 to 2005,
11 covering the growth in 
securitisation activity in the euro area and the single monetary policy whereby all banks are 
subject to one monetary regime. The interest rate taken as the monetary policy indicator is 
the three-month Euribor. 
Securitisation may dramatically affect bank loans dynamics. Standard statistics do not 
take into account that even if a loan has been securitized (and it is therefore expelled from 
banks’ balance sheets) it still continues to finance the economy.
12 We have tried to tackle 
                                                           
11 Data for 1998 has also been included to calculate growth rates. 
12 See Jeffrey (2006) for an overview of the accounting consequences of securitization. 17
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this statistical issue by simply re-adding the flows of securitised loans (SL) to the change in 
the stock of loans to calculate a corrected measure of the growth rate for lending that is 
independent of the volume of asset securitisation (ΔlnLt=ln(Lt+SLt)- lnLt-1). 
To give a rough idea of the bias that can be caused by asset securitisation activity to 
the computation of the lending growth rate, in Figure 8 the gross annual growth rate of 
lending in the euro area (solid line) is compared with that corrected for securitised loans 
outflows (dotted line). The bias tends to increase over time and reach a value of around 2 
percentage points in 2005. 
We use annual data obtained from Bankscope, a commercial database maintained by 
International Bank Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA) and the Brussels-based Bureau van Dijk. In 
particular, we consider balance sheet and income statement data for a sample of around 
3,000 euro-area banks. Table 1 gives some basic information on the dataset.
13 The sample 
accounts for around three quarters of bank lending to euro-area residents. The average size 
of banks in the sample is the largest in the Netherlands, Finland and Spain and smallest in 
Italy, Austria and Germany. Averages for individual bank characteristics remain 
heterogeneous across countries in terms of capital, loan loss provisions and liquidity 
characteristics partly reflecting different stages of the business cycle as well as different 
competitive and institutional conditions. 
In order to proxy for banks’ risk we have also inserted two control variables. The first 
variable represents loan loss provisions as a percentage of loans. This variable is quite standard 
in the literature and represents an ex-post accounting measure of credit risk. The second is 
given by the one-year expected default frequency (EDF) which is a widely-used measure of 
credit risk by financial institutions, including central banks and regulators (see, for instance, 
ECB, 2006, and IMF, 2006).
14 EDF is a forward-looking indicator of credit risk computed by 
Moody’s KMV using financial markets data, balance sheet information and Moody’s 
                                                           
13 Only euro-area banks that have at least four years of consecutive data are included in the sample. Banks 
which do not report positive figures for total assets, total loans and total capital for any given year are 
excluded. Investment banks, government financial agencies, special purpose financial institutions and foreign 
subsidiaries are excluded. Anomalies in loan growth rates are controlled for by checking for possible merger 
and acquisition activity related to full mergers from 1998 to 2005 in the Thomson SDC Platinum database. 
14 Furfine (2006) uses EDF to assess the effect of mergers on banks’ risk in American banks. 18
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15 This measure is very important because it allows us to 
capture transfer of credit risk to the markets not only via true sale securitisation but also by 
means of credit derivatives or synthetic CDOs. EDF information is not available for all banks. 
From 1999 to 2005, the sum of total assets of banks for which Moody’s KMV constructs EDF 
figures accounts for around 52% of the total assets of banks in our sample. For banks that do 
not have EDF we have approximated their default probability by means of a cluster analysis. 
Securitisation data are obtained from Bondware which is a database compiled by 
Dealogic, an independent data distributor and completed with data from Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P), a large private rating agency. Securitisation data start in 1999 and cover an extensive 
range of around 4,500 deals (Table 2). We look at individual deal-by-deal issuance patterns 
from euro-area originators.
16 The advantage of using data on securitisation activity from 
Bondware and S&P is that the name of the originator, date of issuance and deal proceeds are 
registered.
17 We cover all ABS securities as well as cash flow (balance-sheet) CDOs issued 
by euro-area originators that accomplish two main criteria. First, that the bank originating 
the loan passes them from their balance-sheet to the markets via asset-backed securities and, 
second, that it receives funding from investors from the sale of those securities.  
Data on individual securitisation deals have been matched with financial statements of 
each bank originating the deal. Banks active on the securitisation market are characterized 
on average by their large scale (EUR 73 billion of total assets), a lower level of the capital-
to-asset ratio (6.4%) than other banks, as well as a lower liquidity ratio (15.2%). These bank 
characteristics are consistent with the idea that there are some economies of scale in 
securitisation activity. Moreover, banks active in the securitisation market (SEC  banks) 
maintain a lower level of liquidity or capital, because the selling of bank loans on the market 
allows them to be less constrained by liquidity management and minimum capital 
                                                           
15 The calculation of EDF builds on Vasicek and Kealhofer’s extension of the Black-Scholes-Merton option-
pricing framework to make it suitable for practical analysis as well as on the proprietary default database 
owned by KMV (see Kealhofer, 2003, Crosbie and Bohn, 2003 and Garlappi, Shu and Yan, 2007 for further 
details on the construction of EDFs and an example of a recent application). 
16 It includes twelve euro-area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
17 We compare Bondware’s and S&P’s coverage of securitization activity data with individual deal by deal 
data on securitization activity provided by Moody’s, Eurostat and the European Securitisation Forum to obtain 
a comprehensive view of the size of the securitization market. 19
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requirements. The growth rate of lending of SEC  banks is more than triple that of the 
average bank in the sample (16% compared with 5% respectively). 
 
5. Results 
The results of the study are summarized in Table 3. The models have been estimated 
using the GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) which ensures efficiency 
and consistency provided that the models are not subject to serial correlation of order two 
and the instruments used are valid (which is tested for with the Sargan test). 
The first column presents the results for our benchmark equation (1). Changes in 
economic activity have a positive and significant effect on lending: better economic 
conditions increase the number of projects that become profitable in terms of expected net 
present value and hence increase the demand for bank credit from borrowers (Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox, 1993). A 1% increase in GDPN (which produces a bank loan demand shift) 
causes a loan increase of around 0.5%. In contrast the response of bank lending to a 
monetary policy shock has the expected negative sign, suggesting a reduction in loan growth 
as a result of increases in the monetary policy rates (see coefficients for ΔiM t and Δ iM t-1).  
Securitisation activity is positively related to bank lending. That is, banks that 
securitize their assets to a larger extent have, on average, a higher growth rate of lending. 
This result is consistent with the view of securitisation as a source of capital relief and 
additional funding that can be used by banks to grant additional loans.  
The effect of liquidity and capital on lending (LIQ and CAP) indicates that liquid and 
well-capitalised banks have more opportunities to expand their loan portfolio. On the 
contrary, consistent with Ehrmann et al. (2003), the effect for size is negative, and the role of 
size as an indicator of informational asymmetries appears to be quite poor. Several features 
of banking markets in the euro area (low number of banking failures, decreasing role of the 
government, presence of comprehensive deposit insurance schemes, network arrangements 
in groups, strong relationship lending between small banks and small firms) seem to 
diminish the usefulness of size as an indicator of (lower) informational friction. 20
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The riskiness of the credit portfolio has a negative effect on banks’ capacity to increase 
lending. Other things being equal, higher loan loss provisions (LLP) reduce profits, bank 
market capital and, therefore, have negative consequences on supplied lending. A similar 
effect is detected for the expected default frequency (EDF).
18 The mechanism suggests that 
banks’ risk conditions matter for the supply of loans and it probably works by means of 
“market discipline” including  the capacity of banks to issue riskier uninsured debt (i.e. 
bonds or CDs) which might be easier for less risky banks because they have more capacity 
to absorb future losses.
19  
As expected, the interaction terms between size, liquidity, capitalisation and monetary 
policy have the positive sign. In line with the bank lending channel literature, big, liquid and 
well-capitalized banks are better able to buffer their lending activity against shocks affecting 
the availability of external finance. It is worth noting that the coefficient of LIQ*ΔiM is 
however only marginally different from zero. From a monetary policy perspective, the 
implication of this result is that the liquidity indicator reduces its significance if considered 
jointly with the ability of banks to sell loans on to the market. In other words, a bank may be 
less liquid than others but more insulated than more liquid banks because of its greater 
capacity to securitize loans. Bank liquidity in itself, is not sufficiently informative, meaning 
that this indicator has to be considered together with the full range of securitisation issues.  
The effects on lending of a 1% increase in the short-term monetary rate are 
summarised in Figure 9 that shows the effects for banks that make a different use of 
securitization techniques. In particular it compares the effect on the average bank (that 
securitises only 2% of its assets, SEC=0.02) with banks that use securitization in a more 
prominent way: the median SEC bank that securitises 10% of total assets, and the average 
SEC bank that sells one quarter of its assets. The aim is to verify not only whether 
securitisation generates some insulation effects on banks’ loan supply but also to have an 
                                                           
18 The model includes both a backward (LLP) and a forward-looking (EDF) proxy for credit risk. Strong 
collinearity among the variables was not detected. Results remain the same when only a single proxy for credit 
risk is included. 
19 Empirical evidence shows that lower capital levels are associated with higher prices for uninsured liabilities. 
See, for example, Ellis and Flannery (1992) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996). 21
ECB




assessment of the magnitude in relation to securitisation activity. For each bank we consider 
the immediate pass-through (over the first year) and the long-term effects.  
Results indicate that a 1% increase in the monetary policy indicator leads to a decline 
in lending for the average bank of 0.6% in the short term and of 0.7% in the long run. SEC 
banks are on average more insulated from the effects of a monetary policy shock. The 
insulation, however, is not complete for the median SEC bank, for which the long-term 
effect of monetary policy on supplied lending remains significant. The supply of loans 
becomes insulated from monetary policy changes only when a bank is particularly active on 
the securitisation market, with a volume of ABS that accounts for at least a quarter of its 
assets (this corresponds to the average value of SEC banks in our sample): in this case the 
long-term effect is equal to 0.3% with an associated standard error of 0.2.
20  
Since the results presented so far are based on panel data regressions, the long-term 
coefficient on the monetary policy indicator represents the reaction of the average bank in 
the sample or specific categories of SEC banks. Given the heterogeneity of reaction across 
banks (as shown by the significant interaction terms in Table 3), the response of the average 
bank may be not informative as to the overall macroeconomic effect of monetary policy on 
supplied lending. In order to obtain some macroeconomic insights from these results it is 
important to weight the banks in the sample according to their respective market share when 
calculating their response to monetary policy. The resulting overall response of the loan 
market can, in principle, be quite different from the response of the average bank, depending 
on the distribution of the specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capitalisation and 
securitisation) and market shares across banks. Using the coefficients in the baseline model 
and weighting bank-specific characteristics, we found that the overall market response to a 
1% increase in the monetary market rate in the long term is equal to -0.7. This is lower than 
the effect detected in the literature for the period before the introduction of the euro. For 
example, the same macroeconomic relevance exercise performed using the model in 
Ehrmann et al. (2003), which has a very similar set up but is estimated for the period 1992-
1999, gives a long-term coefficient of -1.3. Overall, these results call for two observations. 
                                                           
20 Standard errors for the long-run effect have been approximated with the “delta method” which expands a 
function of a random variable with a one-step Taylor expansion (Rao, 1973). 22
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First, the effectiveness of the bank lending channel has decreased since the introduction of 
the euro; second, the effects of securitisation are far from completely insulating the supply of 
bank loans from monetary policy changes. 
6. Robustness checks 
The robustness of the results has been checked in several ways. First, a test was run to 
introduce an additional interaction term by combining the securitisation measure with the 
growth rate in nominal GDP, giving the basic equation (1):  
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The reason for this test is the possible presence of endogeneity between the business 
cycle and securitisation. For example, Stanton (1998) show that securitisation of lending 
increases in periods of cyclical downturns or individual firm weakness. On the contrary, 
Estrella (2002) finds that securitisation of multi-family home mortgages as a proportion of 
outstanding mortgages tends to decline during recessions. The test, reported in column II of 
Table 3, indicates that the interaction term ϖ is positive and statistically significant while 
other coefficients remain broadly unchanged. Hence the positive effects of securitization on 
bank loan supply is dependent on the level of economic activity. In other words, banks that 
are more active in securitising their assets also experience a significant increase in bank 
lending but this effect diminishes in period of cyclical downturns.  
On the base of these results, if an increase of 1% in the short-term interest rate is 
associated with a reduction in the nominal growth rate of GDP of 0.5% we can easily 
observe that the insulation effect of securitization activity on lending vanishes and banks 
have the same drop in lending independently of their activism on the securitization market. 23
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Another robustness check, reported in the third column of Table 3, compares equation 
(1) with the following model: 
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All variables are defined as before, and  θ t describes a complete set of time dummies. 
This model completely eliminates time variation and tests whether the macro variables used 
in the baseline equation (nominal income and the monetary policy indicator) capture all the 
relevant time effects. Again, the estimated coefficients on the interaction terms do not vary 
very much between the two kinds of model, which testifies to the reliability of the cross-
sectional evidence obtained. 
Finally, we also introduced a geographical control dummy for each model and 
assigned the value of one if the head office of the bank is in a given country and zero if 
elsewhere. In this way we test for the presence, if any, of country-specific institutional 
factors that could alter the results. Also in this case, the interactions between monetary 
policy and bank-specific characteristics remained basically unchanged (see the last column 
of Table 3). 
7. Conclusions 
European banks rarely used securitisation techniques before the introduction of the 
euro. In the last decade, however, there has been a spectacular increase in securitisation 
activity in the euro area. This is partly a global trend but it is also linked to other factors such 
as the increase in financial integration and moves towards a more market-based financial 
system. Therefore the European case provides an interesting framework to check whether or 
not securitisation activity has a significant effect on the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. To do so, we build on existing transmission mechanism literature and use 
an extensive database of banks’ financial statements and securitisation activity. 24
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We find that the changing role of banks from “originate and hold” to “originate, 
repackage and sell” reduces the effectiveness of the bank lending channel of monetary 
policy. Thus, banks making more use of securitisation activity are also more sheltered from 
the effects of monetary policy changes. Moreover, banks making a massive use of 
securitisation, grant more loans and this effect is stronger when the economy is in good 
shape. 
Our results complement the conclusions of earlier studies, which suggest that 
belonging to a larger conglomerate or bank dimension have a dampening effect on monetary 
policy (Campello, 2002; Gambacorta, 2005; Ashcraft, 2006). Taken together the results 
suggest that, nowadays, the role of the bank lending channel has decreased compared with 
the past when banks were smaller, less integrated in groups and less able to liquidate loans 
into secondary markets. At the same time, our macro-relevance exercise highlights that the 
effects of securitisation are far from a complete insulation of loan supply from monetary 
policy changes. Significantly, banks’ risk profile has a significant impact on loan supply, 
highlighting the importance of financial stability from a monetary policy perspective. 
Two issues merit further research. First, this analysis is limited to studying the effects 
of securitisation on bank loan supply, without considering the possible impact on other 
forms of credit supplied to the economy: the positive effect of securitisation on bank lending 
may limit borrowers’ demand for other forms of credit. For instance, with the advent of 
securitisation borrowers might find financing from banks at more favourable terms than 
raising direct funding through the corporate bond market. Likewise, it is also worth 
exploring how monetary policy conduct could or should be suitably adjusted to account for 
the greater liquidity resulting from asset securitisation. For example, securitisation entails a 
stronger role for institutional investors as ultimate buyers of credit. As a result the aggregate 
lending supply is now strongly influenced by financial intermediaries that do not collect 
deposits and which are significantly less affected by changes in the money supply. At the 
same time the effect of the growing influence of institutional investors on credit markets and 
the more prevalent role of banks as credit originators on the transmission mechanism is far 
from being completely understood. 25
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Table 2 
STATISTICS ON SECURITISATION DEALS 1999-2005  
(millions of euros and number of observations) 
Country Mean Median St Dev 1st Quart. 3rd  Quart. Total Obs.
Austria 145 24 410 12 100 6,086 42
Belgium 158 53 350 20 139 18,958 120
Finland 141 83 154 16 240 2,969 21
France 168 49 310 16 150 75,121 446
Germany 137 35 367 15 76 132,415 966
Greece 327 83 404 28 593 13,395 41
Ireland 199 40 359 16 255 27,451 138
Italy 237 56 397 18 294 211,964 896
Luxembourg 295 46 540 13 353 2,948 10
Netherlands 243 32 562 14 200 153,509 632
Portugal 195 27 444 12 145 45,318 232
Spain 293 52 481 18 326 271,156 925
Euro Area 215 40 433 16 200 961,289 4,469 
     Source: Bondware and Standard and Poor’s.27
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Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error Coeff. S.Error
ΔLt-1 -0.151 *** 0.002 -0.147 *** 0.001 -0.020 *** 0.002 -0.090 *** 0.003
ΔGDPNt-1 0.461 *** 0.093 0.589 *** 0.100
SECt-1 0.048 *** 0.000 0.037 *** 0.001 0.036 *** 0.000 0.033 *** 0.000
SIZEt-1 -0.009 *** 0.001 -0.010 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001
LIQt-1 0.191 *** 0.007 0.187 *** 0.005 0.133 *** 0.005 0.368 *** 0.013
CAPt-1 0.005 *** 0.000 0.005 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.000 0.020 *** 0.000
EDFt-1 -0.049 *** 0.001 -0.054 *** 0.001 -0.055 *** 0.001 -0.103 *** 0.004
LLPt-1 -0.112 *** 0.002 -0.129 *** 0.002 -0.072 *** 0.001 -0.100 *** 0.001
Δ i M t -0.622 *** 0.120 -0.680 *** 0.122
Δ i M t-1 -0.199 ** 0.089 -0.281 *** 0.099
Δ i M t*SECt-1 1.922 *** 0.010 1.233 *** 0.032 1.175 *** 0.006 1.465 *** 0.010
Δ i M t*SIZEt-1 0.544 *** 0.063 0.498 *** 0.060 0.633 *** 0.060 0.590 *** 0.060
Δ i M t*LIQt-1 1.078 * 0.586 0.845 0.555 0.737 0.470 0.663 1.032
Δ i M t*CAPt-1 0.153 *** 0.008 0.143 *** 0.007 0.136 *** 0.001 0.090 ** 0.036
ΔGDPt*SECt-1 2.490 *** 0.021
Constant 0.059 *** 0.002 0.058 *** 0.002 0.057 *** 0.002
Time dummies  NO NO YES YES
Country dummies NO NO NO YES
Sample period
No. of banks, no. of 
observations 3,312 15,403 3,312 15,403 3,312 15,403 3,312 15,403
Sargan test (2nd step; pvalue) 0.312 0.126 0.110 0.152
MA(1), MA(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.062
The model is given by the following equation, which includes interaction terms that are the product of the monetary policy indicator and a bank specific characteristic:
with i=1,…, N  and  t=1, …, T and where: N = number of banks; Lit= loans in the balance sheet of bank i in quarter t; i Mt = monetary policy indicator; GDPNit = 
nominal GDP; SECit = securitization ratio; SIZEit=log of total assets; LIQit=liquidity ratio; CAPit=capital to asset ratio; LLPit=loan loss provision over total assets; 
EDFit =Expected default frequency. One lag has been introduced in order to obtain white noise residuals. The models have been estimated using the GMM estimator 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). In the GMM estimation, instruments are the second and further lags of the growth rate of the dependent variable and of the 
bank-specific characteristics included in each equation. Inflation, GDP growth rate and the monetary policy indicator are considered as exogenous variables. The 
interactions terms and control variables that turned out not to be statistically significant in all the models have been removed from the table. The symbols *, **, and 
*** represent significance levels of 10 per cent, 5 per cent, and 1 per cent respectively.
1998-2005 1998-2005 1998-2005 1998-2005
(III)                        (IV)                         
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SECURITISATION BY COUNTRY OF ISSUANCE IN 2005  
















Sources: European Securitisation Forum, Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance 
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Figure 3
SECURITISATION BY COUNTRY OF COLLATERAL 
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Sources: Eurostat, European Securitisation Forum,  Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured 
Finance International, Bloomberg. 
Figure  4
SECURITISATION BY TYPE OF INSTRUMENT IN 2005 












Sources: European Securitisation Forum,  Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance 
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CHANGES IN CREDIT STANDARDS ON LOANS TO CORPORATIONS 































Short-term Long-term All loans
 
Source: European Central Bank. 
Note: The net percentage refers to the difference between the sum of the percentages for “tightened considerably” and 
“tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages for “eased considerably” and “eased somewhat”. See 
http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/lend/html/index.en.html for further information. 
 
Figure 5
EUROPEAN ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES INVESTOR LOCATION 














Source: The Bond Market Association Primary Distribution Survey. 31
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Figure 7
DISTANCE TO DEFAULT 
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Source: Moody’s KMV. 
 
Figure 8
TOTAL BANK LENDING IN THE EURO AREA 














Gross rate Corrected for securitisation (1)
 
Sources: Thomson Financial, Dealogic, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Structured Finance International, Bloomberg.  
Note: (1) The growth rate is corrected to take into account securitised loans from banks resident in the euro area.  
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EFFECT OF A ONE PER CENT INCREASE OF THE MONETARY 
























Note: We evaluate the effect of a one per cent increase of the short-term interest rate on bank lending considering banks 
with a different activism in the securitization market. SEC is the ratio of annual securitized lending and the total assets at 
the beginning of the year. The coefficients are calculated on the base of the benchmark model in Table 3. The symbols *, 
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